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The paper ofers a framework to identify the most important generative 
processes of terrorist campaigns1. It argues for more comprehensive explana-
tions than those based on macro-causal analyses. This requires focusing on links 
between macro and micro levels involving a plurality of agents. Campaigns are 
generally contingent on three main agents: elite members of armed groups (AGs) who 
plan them; insurgency collaborators (ICs) emerging from those communities whose 
interests AGs claim to defend; and active ighters (AFs) who carry out terrorist attacks 
and who emerge from the same communities2. At the same time, the analysis 
of these agents has to be combined with three kinds of causal or social mecha-
nisms, referring to the most important conditions, motivations, and social inte-
ractions underlying a terrorist campaign3. First, there are situational mechanisms that 
identify agents’ constraints and opportunities associated with the psychological, 
cultural, political, economic, and military context of an armed struggle. They 
specify the space of possibilities within which agents select their lines of actions. 
Second, such mechanisms are linked to action formation mechanisms that analyti-
cally concentrate on agents’ decision-making. Their clariication helps specify 
the most basic or “molecular” micro-foundation processes conducive to violence. 
Finally, both mechanisms are intertwined with transformational mechanisms, descri-
bing the interactions of agents and bringing about a terrorist campaign as the 
originally observed collective and macro-outcome. Figure 1, which is inspired by 









Figure 1 : Agents and Generative Mechanisms of Terrorist Campaigns
The three agents are analyzed as follows: AGs in Section 2, ICs in Section 
3, and AFs in Section 4. The three social mechanisms are simultaneously and 
separately discussed for each agent within the corresponding section4. Given the 




exhaustive contribution, but only an ideal-typical (in Weber’s parlance) generative 
model. Empirical evidence, for the most part drawn from Al-Qaeda’s armed 
struggle, should be considered only as illustrative examples and not immedia-
tely intended as claims of the primary, let alone unique, causal role of examined 
factors. Special attention is paid to the multi-faceted constellation of motivations 
behind agents involved in terrorism, arguing for a more general paradigm of 
rationality beyond certain assumptions of the rational choice theory5.
2. ARMED GROUPS
2.1. CONTEXT OF TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS 
Here, we conventionally limit our analysis to non-state AGs. A concise 
typology of terrorist campaigns might be based on the following six recur-
rent political outcomes or strategic objectives (Tosini, 2007a, 2007b; cf. Schmid 
and Jongman, 1988; Hofman, 2006; Law 2009): 1) the liberation of a terri-
tory associated with a speciic ethnic and/or religious community (nationalist 
campaign), e.g., the Basque ETA vs. the Spanish government and the Palestinians 
vs. Israel; 2) the liberation of a territory encompassing several communities 
and their political entities, as well as their uniication based on common ethnic 
and/or religious traits (pan-nationalist campaign), e.g., the transnational jihadist 
movement from the 1980s anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan up to the recent 
jihadist groups’ struggle embracing the entire Muslim community or nation 
(ummah); 3) the overthrow of existing regimes to establish alternative orders 
(revolutionary campaign), e.g., the Red Brigades’ struggle for a communist society 











campaign), e.g., the Ulster paramilitary groups vs. the Republicans in Northern 
Ireland; 5)  the ighting to support forces of good involved in a cosmic war 
against those of evil (symbolic campaign), e.g., the Japanese cult of Aum Shinrikyo, 
known for the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway; 6) the achievement 
of very speciic goals such as the stop of abortion (single-issue campaign), e.g., the 
Army of God’s violence following the 1973 legalization of abortion in the US. 
Certain campaigns are a combination of types. Our case study, Al-Qaeda and its 
network of extremist Islamists, is a clear example. Nationalist objectives can be attri-
buted to Al-Qaeda’s ailiates, such as some Iraqi Sunni insurgents, and allies, such 
as the Taliban in Afghanistan, with their goals to compel occupiers to withdraw 
from Iraq and Afghanistan (Hashim, 2006, 2009; Pape, 2005; Hafez, 2007; Pape 
and Feldaman, 2010). However, a more distinctive feature of Al-Qaeda and other 
ailiates such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a pan-Islamic nationalism, namely a resistance 
by a “vanguard” of Muslim ighters (Campanini and Merzan, 2007) in defense of 
the Muslim community and for the liberation of all its territories from “un-Islamic” 
forces such as the US and its allies, the “far enemy” (al-adou al-baeed) (Al-Zawahiri, 2001; 
Al-Zayyat, 2004; Gerges, 2005; Hegghammer, 2010; Kepel and Milelli, 2008; 
Moghadam, 2008; Riedel, 2008; Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010). Furthermore, these 
objectives are intertwined with the revolutionary attempt to overthrow “apos-
tate” regimes in the Muslim world, the “near enemy” (al-adou  al-qareeb). Several 
Sunni groups ailiated or allied with Al-Qaeda pursue the destruction of “inidel” 
authorities ruling their countries: the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Algeria; 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula in Saudi Arabia; Jemaah Islamiyya in Indonesia; 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Pakistan; and the Al-Shabab Al-Majahedeen in Somalia. Finally, 
an additional feature of certain Sunni campaigns, such as those of Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
and some Pakistani organizations, has been sectarian attacks on the Shiites, a form 
of vigilantism (Nasr, 2006; Cordesman, 2008; Tosini, 2010).
Strategic objectives and the underlying grievances and cleavages certainly 
help understand general conditions of an armed struggle, but are insuicient 
to account for AGs’ decision to employ terrorism instead of other combat 
methods. This requires focusing on more speciic constraints or situational 
mechanisms afecting AGs’ actions and related to the operational context of terrorist 
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campaigns. From this perspective, the asymmetric nature of conlicts is a crucial 
factor (Boyns and Ballard, 2004). Campaigns such as those of Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban, for example, consist of confronting unrivalled superpowers like the US 
army. Here, AGs bypass direct ighting with the enemy and take advantage of its 
weaknesses to restore a balance of coercion (Kushner, 2003; Thornton, 2007). 
Achieving strategic objectives necessitates realizing intermediate efects that we 
call process or operative goals (cf. Abrahms, 2012), which include the capacity for 
combat methods exerting coercion under constraints of asymmetry. A question 
remains: what is the rationality of terrorism with respect to such circumstances?
2.2. RATIONALITY OF TERRORIST TACTICS 
To answer, we focus on the action formation mechanisms of AGs, who 
should be analyzed as rational agents resorting to tactics to deal with an imba-
lance of power (Crenshaw, 1998; US Army–Marine Corps, 2007). Al-Qaeda’s 
operational art, for example, conceives of all means as legitimate combat 
methods, including mass casualty attacks on civilians (Adamsky, 2010). For jiha-
dists, rules of international law exist only for their enemies. Terrorists exploit 
this kind of asymmetry to their advantage (Münkler, 2005; Kaldor,  2006; 
Thornton, 2007; Reed, 2008). Iraqi terrorism and incidents such as the 2004 
Madrid and 2005 London bombings clearly exemplify this stance. Since 2003 
an increasing wave of car bombs in Iraq have targeted civilians, particularly 
the Shiites. Searching for tactical alternatives to direct confrontations with the 
US army, AGs have aimed to compensate for their military weakness and to 
exert pressure on occupiers and their local allies (Hafez, 2007). As with all 
terrorist tactics (Schmid and Jongman, 1988), Iraqi AGs have played on the 
fear and shock among civilians to inluence audiences beyond their direct targets 
(i.e., their victims) by: 1) creating a condition of chaos and insecurity among 
the Iraqi population to delegitimize incumbents and the new Iraqi govern-
ment; 2)  terrorizing civilians to deter Iraqis viewed as efective or potential 
collaborationists, especially (even if not exclusively) the Shiites, from any 
compliance with occupiers; 3) provoking counterinsurgent and Shiite militia 
reprisals against the Sunni community to polarize sectarian conlicts between 
Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs (Nasr, 2006; Cordesman, 2008; Tosini, 2010). 
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More in-depth analyses should then explain the calculations behind speci-
ic terrorist tactics such as suicide bombings. This requires considering peculiar 
advantages of kamikaze attacks. “Technical” potentials are often stressed in the lite-
rature: 1) greater damage with fewer combatants and casualties; 2) the ability of 
disguised bombers to enter heavily guarded locations; 3) their capacity to modify 
direction to maximize casualties; 4) the impossibility, for the enemy, of obtai-
ning information from successful attackers; 5) and the minimal costs of attacker 
training (Gambetta, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005; Pape, 2005; Ayers, 2008; Moghadam, 
2008; Hassan, 2010). These features make a diference when destroying hard targets 
like military barracks and armored vehicles. But the question is why certain AGs, 
for example in Iraq, have adopted suicide bombings against soft targets like the 
Shiite population, when other tactics could also massacre defenseless civilians 
without sacriicing militants as bombers (Cordesman, 2008). 
To answer, certain communicative advantages of suicide attacks should 
be examined (Hofman and McCormick, 2004). Following signaling theory 
(Gambetta, 2009a, 2009b), our hypothesis is that AGs rationally rely on the 
expected ability of suicide missions to work as efective signals of determina-
tion and of a potential of violence behind the AGs’ demands and threats. AGs 
probably count on the discriminating features of immolation. Sacriicing one’s 
life is a costly action and a tangible and hard-to-fake signal, which makes it a 
convincing proof of commitment and fanaticism. Such aspects is exploited by 
AGs for propaganda purposes by using bombers’ last wills circulating on the 
Internet. Here, representations of attackers and manipulations of their images 
capitalize on the signaling qualities of “martyrdom”. Videos and other accounts, 
while obsessively emphasizing the extraordinary nature of such actions, aim 
at merging AGs’ and bombers’ identities in order to credibly convey the mili-
tary preparation, extreme devotion to a good cause, radical opposition to the 





the completeness of power is the fusion of the attacker and the martyr (i.e., the suicide bomber).
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2.3. INTERACTIONS WITH COLLABORATORS AND FIGHTERS
Turning to transformational mechanisms, we irst focus on AGs’ main lines 
of action towards the other agents of our model. Consider once again the case 
of suicide bombings. AGs rationally engage in suicide attacks to psychologically 
constrain not only the enemy but also at least two other audiences or receivers, 
namely potential ICs and potential AFs within the community. AGs clearly strive 
for the community’s support. To gain collaboration, videos and biographical 
accounts of bombers frequently exalt the latter’s nobility, zeal, and devotion to 
religion. AGs want their presumed constituency to be conident of militants’ 
determination.7 This plays once again on the distinctive signaling qualities 
embodied in the costly behavior of suicide missions. As with communication 
directed towards the enemy, AGs exploit suicidal acts to prove extreme self-sacri-
ice for their constituency’s interests, gambling on bombers’ ability to succeed as 
a tangible, hard-to-fake signal of solidarity8. Following the same logic, kamikaze 
communiqués are meant as a recruitment tool for new AFs. Here, missions are 
systematically framed as martyrdom in the service of a good cause and a god. 
More or less explicit calls are made for all Muslims’ highest moral obligation: 
sacriicing oneself in battle for jihad against oppressors of the Muslim nation9. 
7  In last wills circulating on the Internet, ighters’ reputations are frequently underlined as a 






to be dedicated  to  its  “martyrs”. On  the  Iraqi  battleield,  too,  insurgents  have produced 
memories of their ighters, as documented by the long series of Al-Furgan’s (2009) produc-











Emphasis is often put on the suggestive appeal to pride and manhood signaled 
by the fallen in defense of their “brothers” and, conversely, on the sense of 
shame and guilt that should be felt by those remaining passive once confronted 
with abuses and violence against their community (Hafez, 2006).
Attempts by AGs to gain support from the community members include 
other lines of action. First of all, some AGs provide services during their 
campaigns, e.g., Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s economic aid for AFs’ families, espe-
cially those of suicide bombers (Levitt, 2006). Second, symbolic recognitions 
are used to mark the elevated status of community members paying a high 
price, the loss of a beloved, in the armed struggle. Finally, physical and psycho-
logical coercion can also be a mechanism to force compliance and recruit-
ment. Selective violence against civilians is often employed both to punish 
collaboration with the enemy and to deter defections (Kalyvas, 2006). In Iraq, 
for example, in addition to attacks on the Shiites, insurgents have targeted 
even Sunnis, especially those who since 2006 have established the Al-Sahawa 
movement forming an alliance with Americans to oppose Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s 
interference in tribes’ economic and political interests (Cordesman, 2008). 
3. INSURGENCY COLLABORATORS
3.1. CONDITIONS OF COLLABORATION 
Beside the pressure of the AGs, collaboration is also contingent on poli-
tical, economic, and cultural conditions afecting ICs. Political processes 
causing discrimination and deprivation can certainly drive the commu-
nity members to assist AGs. In 2003 in Iraq, for example, two orders of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority – aimed at the “de-Baathiication” of Iraq and 
the dissolution of the former Iraqi army – marked the Sunni Arabs’ traumatic 






their tribal interests. Indeed, the US gave unprecedented power to the Shiite 
Arabs and the Kurds, increasing the Sunnis’ humiliation and adding the risk 
of reprisals by their Iraqi rivals (Hashim, 2006; 2009).
Political and religious ideologies can also facilitate support. For example, 
Islamist narratives of jihad and martyrdom have been a vital source of legiti-
macy for several AGs in recent decades, e.g., Hezbollah, the Palestinian orga-
nizations, and the Al-Qaeda network. This results from two main trends. 
The irst goes back to the Sunnis’ radical conception of jihad inspired by 
such thinkers as Taqi Al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Muhammad 
Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (d. 1791), and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966). The second refers to 
the Shiite tradition. After the centuries of quietism that followed the Imam 
Husayn’s martyrdom (680 AD), since the 1960s several clerics such as Rudollah 
Khomeyni (d. 1989), Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr (d. 1980), and Muhammad 
Husayn Fadlallah (b. 1935) have called for Muslims’ armed militancy, including 
suicide missions: a crucial rationale for both the young Iranian “martyrs” of 
the 1980s Iran-Iraq war and for the Hezbollah campaign against Israel in the 
1980s and 1990s. Despite the diferences between the two traditions a conver-
gence has emerged in the last two decades, also due Hezbollah’s inluence on 
Hamas’s use of suicide missions since the 1990s (Freamon, 2003; Cook 2005; 
Moghadam, 2007; on martyrdom in Islam see also Denaro, 2006; Cook, 2007). 
Iraq, too, has experienced a revival of Islamism since the First Gulf War (1991), 
when Saddam Hussein began to concede more space to religious institutions, 
thus creating a context from which post-2003 Sunni insurgents could draw on 
ideological resources to gain legitimacy (Jackson, 2006).
3.2. ACTION FORMATION MECHANISMS OF SUPPORT
Rooted in such conditions, collaboration can be instrumentally inspired by 
several advantages: the eicacy attributed to armed struggle (propagandized as 
such by AGs) in defending interests, such as the Sunni Arabs’ privileges endange-
red by the fall of Saddam Hussein; and a variety of incentives ofered by some AGs, 
including economic assistance to AFs’ families. Consider the irst circumstance. 
Escalations of suicide bombings in Iraq since 2003, for instance, were related to 
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turning points when Sunnis supported insurgency in order to resist challenges to 
their power: 1) the increase in attacks in the second half of 2003 followed the 2003 
coalition orders’ dismantling of their rule; 2) the high number of attacks between 
May and July 2004 was in reaction to the US handover of authority to the interim 
government; 3) a further escalation between September 2004 and January 2005 
was due to the election of the assembly tasked with drafting the new constitution; 
4) a new massive wave between April and September 2005 was triggered by the 
appointment of Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani as president and the Shiite Ibrahim 
Jaafari as prime minister, and by their endorsement of the draft constitution; 
5) a new increase in the second half of 2006 was a response to the assassination 
of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s leader, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, and to the subsequent secu-
rity plan of the new Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki (which included an amnesty 
for insurgents); 6) a inal escalation between January and September 2007 was in 
reaction to the US troop “surge” (Hafez, 2007; Tosini, 2010). 
Attempts to explain collaboration exclusively in terms of beneits are 
nonetheless questionable because of some limitations of accounts inspired by the 
rational choice theory. As shown by R. Boudon (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009a, 2009b), 
the strongest versions of the rational choice theory include six postulates: any 
social phenomenon emerges from individual decisions (individualism: postulate P1); 
actions can always be understood (understanding: P2); actions are caused by reasons 
in the minds of agents (rationality: P3); these reasons stem from consideration by 
agents of the consequences of their behavior (instrumentalism: P4); agents focus 
mainly on the consequences to themselves (egoism: P5); agents choose actions with 
the most favorable balance of costs and beneits (maximization: P6). 
Further versions have certainly amended these assumptions. Among them, 
the theory of bounded rationality replaces P6 with the hypothesis P6’ that agents 
have limited capacity to maximize. In this sense, terrorism generally fails 
to achieve AGs’ strategic goals (Abrahms,  2012). Nonetheless, AGs and some 
ICs resort to violence for more limited operative objectives associated with the 
asymmetry of warfare and to satisfy short-term interests. Apart from material 
beneits, social prestige and reputation conferred by AGs’ leaders on ICs have 
desirable symbolic advantages, namely a “social capital” exerting inluence 
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within one’s ethnic or religious circle. Likewise, postulate P5 may be comple-
mented with the claim P5’ that, in some cases, ICs act not egoistically but also 
for their intimates or for their community. 
Two further perspectives should be considered. The irst concerns the 
impact of afective factors on ICs’ actions (Weber, 1978 [1922]). For example, 
support for AGs can be explained by a desire for revenge due to emotions such 
as outrage at the enemy’s violence and abuses. Second, no less crucial factors 
are norms and values held unconditionally (i.e., regardless of consequences of 
actions). This orientation can be better conceptualized within a general theory of 
rationality, in which the versions of the rational choice theory mentioned above 
are only speciic forms10. Other forms of rationality are possible and require 
exclusively P1, P2, and P3. Here, agents’ orientation is still rational but not 
reducible to instrumentalism, which means that at times even P4 is untenable. On 
this level of rationality both descriptive and normative beliefs are possible, which 
correspond to the forms of cognitive rationality11 and axiological rationality12, respec-
tively. Several accounts of ICs’ actions referring to ideological and religious 
principles are clearly examples of the axiological orientation13. Their reduction 
to the instrumental versions of rationality would be a crude error. 




















A second component of transformational mechanisms responsible for terro-
rist campaigns relates to ICs’ lines of action towards both AGs and potential 
AFs. Collaboration with AGs takes on several empirical forms. It ofers important 
resources for AGs such as information, hideouts, and territory for military trai-
ning. After the 2003 fall of the Baath regime, for instance, the occupiers’ inter-
ference in Sunni tribes’ interests induced their leaders to form an alliance with 
both former Baathists and even extremist Islamists, including Al-Qaeda in Iraq. 
This explains why insurgents were able to maintain strongholds inside Sunni-
dominated areas, like the Anbar province, from where they could launch attacks 
on Baghdad and on traditional Shiite holy cities such as Karbala and Najaf.
On the other hand, the Iraqi Sunnis demonstrate rationality as well with their 
decisions to switch sides once conditions for their collaboration with insurgents 
turn unfavorable. As seen, in 2006 Sunni tribal leaders established their own mili-
tias, known as Al-Sahawa, to defend their interests against Al-Qaeda’s fanaticism. 
They had become increasingly alienated from their former ally and supportive of 
American counterinsurgency, which played on such opposition by inancing and 
arming the militias (Galbraith, 2008; Gonzalez, 2009; Hashim 2009; Munson, 2009). 
In the long run, the US military superiority and economic aid to Al-Sahawa made 
Al-Qaeda’s reprisals incapable of preventing further Sunni defections. 
Moreover, everyday life in communities supporting AGs includes cultural 
emblems and rituals exalting militancy and martyrdom. Analytically, this 
has to do with those ICs’ lines of actions involving potential AFs and faci-
litating the latter’s engagement and recruitment. Radical religious centers 










inluencing potential AFs by emphasizing militants’ heroism. Under certain 
circumstances, almost an entire community can overwhelmingly identify 
itself with the political cause and ideology encouraging the armed struggle 
and martyrdom. Both moral disengagement with respect to violence and 
the de-humanization of the enemy (in the sense of Bandura, 1998) might 
strongly penetrate a community enough to normalize its perception of terro-
rism, as shown by ethnographic investigations of Palestinians14.
4. ACTIVE FIGHTERS
4.1. PROFILES, PERSONALITY, AND IDEOLOGICAL FRAMINGS
The irst set of situational mechanisms responsible for terrorist militancy 
concerns the socio-demographic background of AFs. Radicalization depends to 
some extent on conditions related to national and ethnic belonging, religious ai-
liation, education, and marital and economic status. Today, their explanatory rele-
vance is continuously discussed, especially in comparative analyses of extremist 
Islamists. Apart from the much-studied Palestinians, recent research has focused 
on ighters involved in the Iraq insurgency, particularly on foreign jihadists from 
Muslim countries (Hafez, 2007; Cordesman, 2008; Moghadam, 2008; Hassan, 
2010; Pape and Feldman, 2010). One example is a report on nearly 700 records 
(aka Sinjar Records) of militants that entered Iraq between August 2006 and 
August 2007 (CTC 2007, 2008). Their average age was 24-25, which suggests that 














like the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad. Of the 156 ighters that speciied their occupa-
tion, 42 % were students. Twenty-one countries were mentioned as their origin. 
Saudis contributed the highest number of ighters (41 % of the 576 that listed 
their nationality). The other most common countries were Libya, Morocco, Syria, 
Yemen, and Algeria. Two were also from France, one from Britain, and one from 
Sweden. Libya contributed the most ighters per capita. Of the 376 ighters that 
indicated their “work” in Iraq, 56 % were to be suicide bombers (istishhadi) and 
the plurality of them were Saudi (70 ighters or 47 % of the total of Saudi ighters). 
Nonetheless, Libyans (51 or 85 % of the total of Libyan ighters) and Moroccans 
(22 or 91 % of the total of Moroccan ighters) who refer to their “work” were 
much more likely to be enlisted as bombers. Focusing on Saudis, another report 
shows the high presence of northerners, which can be attributed to the fact that 
both geographic proximity to Iraq and loyalties to tribes located on both sides of 
the border might have conditioned recruitment (Hegghammer, 2007).
Second, personality traits should also be examined as situational factors. 
Many scholars tend to marginalize their signiicance, underlining the primary 
role of political and ideological causes15. But this does not explain why only 
a minority of people exposed to such conditions radicalize and become AFs. 
For instance, a recent study comparing a group of 15 incarcerated Palestinian 
would-be suicide bombers with a control group of 12 non-suicide terro-
rists reveals that would-be suicide attackers, if not psychotic, had distinctive 
psychological traits. They manifested two main personality patterns – a depen-
dent-avoidant personality (60 % of the would-be suicides as opposed to the 
17 % of the controls) and an impulsive-unstable personality (26.7 %; 67 % in 
the control group) – and suicidal tendencies (40 %; with no symptoms in the 
control group) (Merari, 2010). These features constitute factors that make indi-








Third, ideological narratives circulating in the community and propa-
gandized by AGs also play a role. This has to do with the strength of certain 
convictions leading to militancy and participation in highly risky missions. 
For example, political and religious values seem to be determinant for 
some foreign militants who volunteered for the Iraqi insurgency. Field 
research and interviews document the devotion of young Saudis to the 
defense of the Islamic community. This derives from a speciic ideology 
which can be traced back to the 1960s, when King Faisal propagandized 
the ideal of Islamic solidarity (al-tadamun al-islami), forming the basis of the 
pan-Islamic nationalism previously discussed. In the 1980s the Saudi state 
played on this ideal to mobilize jihadists during the anti-Soviet Afghan 
campaign. This constitutes a motivational framing (in Snow’s and Byrd’s 
parlance [2007]) that has greatly inluenced generations of militants to take 
part in campaigns in Bosnia, Chechnya, more recently in Iraq, and once 
again in Afghanistan (Hegghammer, 2010). Its impact is ampliied when 
combined with both the celebration of heroism by the AGs’ propaganda 
using martyrdom videos and with the radical preaching within the Muslim 
world justifying violent jihad and suicide missions.














Focusing on AFs’ action formation mechanisms, a irst step is to 
recognize the contributions of the rational choice theory. In some cases, 
ighters may rationally conceive of their behavior as an instrumental action 
(Zweckrational,  Weber,  1978 [1922]) with respect to both egoistic and altruis-
tic goals. In suicide missions, for instance, the former might consist of 
purely personal reasons triggering suicidal tendencies (Merari, 2010). An 
example is a status crisis caused by a perceived loss of reputation following 
past misdeeds such as extramarital relationships, and reliance on acts of 
martyrdom as way to expiate one’s deviant behavior (Pedahzur, 2005). In 
other circumstances, engaging in risky political activities can also be an 
opportunity for overcoming social marginalization (Khosrokhavar 2005, 
2009), gaining social consideration (Ricoli, 2005; cf. Elster, 2005), and for 
experiencing solidarity (Wintrobe,  2006; cf.  Elster,  2009) and a sense of 
comradeship (Sageman, 2008). In other cases, instrumental rationality has 
to do less with self-interest than with altruistic goals17. Examples are material 
beneits for the AFs’ intimates such as economic aid for family members 
provided by AGs. Altruism can also consist of viewing self-sacriice as the 















Again, approaches exclusively based on the rational choice theory run 
the risk of ignoring other motivational factors. Any realistic account of 
social behavior should irst consider emotions (Elster, 2007; Barbalet, 2006; 
Goodwin et al., 2001; Goodwin et al., 2004; Rice, 2009). For example, mili-
tancy might result from such action tendencies as a desire to avenge inti-
mates due to anger following their assassination by occupying forces. Other 
emotions such as shame and guilt might be intertwined with embracing 
engagement as a reaction to wrongdoings (Elster, 2007). Radicalization could 
also be afected by frustrated expectations and deprivation generated by unfa-
vorable socio-economic conditions (Gambetta and Hertog, 2009). Finally, 
feelings such as loyalty are often behind the drive to protect the community’s 
honor (Goodwin  et  al.,  2001; Hegghammer, 2007). As with ICs, normative 
beliefs – intended as rational orientations irrespective of the instrumentalist 
versions of rationality – are also decisive motivational elements (Elster, 2005, 
2009; see also Durkheim, 2006 [1897]; Barbagli, 2009). There are witnesses 
to AFs’ references to moral principles having a binding efect on their stances. 
Examples derived from ield research on foreign ighters who take part in the 
Iraq insurgency show both the duty to wage jihad for the liberation of Muslim 
countries from oppressors, which complies with the principle of Islamic soli-
darity (Hegghammer, 2007; Peraino, 2008)19, and the search for martyrdom, 
as the noblest sacriice on the path of one’s god and religion20.
19  For example, in a video of May 2006 released by the Mujahideen Shura Council one militant 
states: “By God, we did not leave Saudi Arabia to escape from reality. On the contrary, we 
left  to stand side-by-side with our brothers  in  Iraq. And we are  full of  sadness when we 
witness our sisters being humiliated. And our brothers in Fallujah are being killed on a daily 
basis. We came to bring victory  for  the  religion of Allah, and  to stand against  the  inidel 
occupation of Iraq that spread corruption and tyranny in the land.” (NEFA, 2006).







Transformational mechanisms responsible for terrorist campaigns are also 
based on AFs’ lines of action towards members of peer groups or comrades, AGs 
and ICs. Recruitment is generally contingent on interactions involving a plura-
lity of agents (Horgan, 2009). Participation in networks of radicals based on 
friendship and/or kinship social bonds is a source of pressure on potential AFs 
(della Porta, 1995; Sageman, 2004). As in cases like the 2005 London bombings, 
early phases of radicalization include low-risk activities such as attending student 
associations, sport teams, or religious centers, where ties can be forged and become 
increasingly intense. This process might be followed by a sharing of extremist 
views and “out-group hate” – derived, for example, from radical preachers such 
as Abu Hamza Al-Masri at the Finsbury Park mosque in London – which in turn 
could be fostered by the strengthening of “in-group love” and mutual loyalty 
between peers. Apart from face-to-face interactions, radicalization is also facilita-
ted by the Internet. Chat rooms and jihadist forums are becoming complementary 
and alternative breeding grounds and channels to direct relationships with the 
AG’s elite members (Sageman, 2008; Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010; Mussawi, 2010).
AFs’ attitudes towards the AG’s elite generally take on the form of a charis-
matic legitimacy (Weber, 1978 [1922]). Potential AFs afected by traits such 
as a dependent-avoidant personality are especially vulnerable to AGs’ propa-
ganda and incitement. Psychological patterns like this make them not only 
more compliant with calls by religious igures, AG commanders and organi-
zers perceived as moral authorities and heroes but also more responsive to 
ideological narratives from their community members, radical preachers, or 
mass media exalting violent jihad and martyrdom (Merari, 2010). However, 
our hypothesis is that the disposition to volunteer for risky missions – obser-
ved for example in the case of Hezbollah, Palestinian organizations, and 
Iraqi insurgents – hardly results solely from personality. The more that 
combines with both the emotional, instrumental, and normative orienta-
tions previously discussed and with interactions within peer groups, the 
more probable violent radicalization and terrorist campaigns are. 
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5. CONCLUSION
This article aimed to outline a general framework for the explanation of 
terrorist campaigns. We proposed a generative model combining a plurality of 
agents and social mechanisms, as summarized in Figure 2: 
Figure 2: An Ideal-typical generative model of terrorist campaigns
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Three main agents were identiied. The irst are the AGs and their elite 
members. Our thesis is that their use of terrorist tactics should be traced to 
instrumental calculations. Violence against civilians is selected here because 
of its presumed greater eiciency (compared with other combat methods) for 
operative goals rooted in the situational conditions of asymmetric conlicts. ICs 
are the second type of agent. We emphasized the necessity of overcoming limi-
tations of accounts based on the rational choice theory – which certainly helps 
to shed light on instrumental cases of collaboration – to include additional 
orientations contingent on emotions and norms linked to speciic social and 
cultural conditions. AFs emerged as the third agents. As with ICs, their motiva-
tions cannot be reduced to an instrumental rationality, despite its relevance in 
clarifying some trajectories of militancy. The latter is a more highly complex 
process that normally combines calculations with emotional and axiological 
factors, all inevitably intertwined with social background, personality traits, 
and chains of communal and cultural situations. The model also speciies some 
of the most important mechanisms which make it possible to describe a terro-
rist campaign as a collective and macro outcome, that is, interactions between 
AGs and potential ICs, between AGs and potential AFs, between potential AFs 
and their community members, including their peer groups. 
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